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The Effects of Family Leave on Wages, Employment, 
and the Family Wage Gap: Distributional Implications 
Jean Kimmel, Ph.D.* 
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, J.D., Ph.D.** 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most striking demographic change in the United 
States in the past fifty years is the growing involvement of females in 
the labor force. During this time period, overall female labor force 
participation1 increased from 33.9% in 1950 to 60.1% in 2001; while 
during the same time, male labor force participation actually fell from 
86.4% to 74.4%.2 These percentages compare to a Labor Force 
Participation Rate (LFPR) at the turn of the twentieth century of over 
eighty-five percent for males and just twenty percent for females.3 
Currently, females comprise 46.6% of the United States workforce.4 
Over the course of the past half-century, females have integrated 
themselves into the workforce, broadening their horizons with respect 
to lifetime commitments to full-time employment, enjoying 
 * Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Western Michigan University. 
 ** Associate Professor, Department of Economics, San Diego State University. The 
authors thank Elias Shukralla for his generous assistance with DOL data analyses and his 
research support. 
 1. Labor force participants include those with paid employment as well as those actively 
seeking work. BRUCE E. KAUFMAN & JULIE L. HOTCHKISS, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR 
MARKETS 116 (6th ed. 2003).  
 2. Id. at 119. Note that these Labor Force Participation Rates (LFPR) are somewhat 
higher when considering prime-aged workers (aged twenty-five to fifty-four). For these 
workers, the LFPR is 91.6% for males and 76.8% for females. See SAUL D. HOFFMAN & 
SUSAN L. AVERETT, WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY: FAMILY, WORK, AND PAY, ch. 7, at 2 
(forthcoming 2004), available at http://www.buec.udel.edu/hoffmans/textbook/index.htm (last 
modified Dec. 10, 2003).  
 3. HOFFMAN & AVERETT, supra note 2, ch. 7, at 3. 
 4. See KAUFMAN & HOTCHKISS, supra note 1, at 140. 
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occupational diversity, and even experiencing some success with 
movement into upper management.5 Evidence of this progress can be 
seen in improvements in the ratio of median earnings of full-time, 
year-round employed females to like earnings of males, which has 
increased from approximately 60.7% in 1960 to 76.3% in 2001.6  
Within this growing female workforce presence, notable change 
has been seen through the remarkable influx of mothers into the 
workforce, particularly married mothers with pre-school aged 
children. Historically, these women were the least likely to 
participate in the paid market. For example, in 1960 only 18.6% of 
mothers of children under the age of six were in the labor force;7 by 
2001 this figure had grown to 62.5%.8 While mothers are 
increasingly likely to engage in paid employment, the motherhood 
wage gap (the gap between the wages of mothers and like non-
mothers) has not improved. This wage ratio has remained at 
approximately ninety percent since 1970. Jane Waldfogel suggests 
this lack of confluence between the gender wage gap and the 
motherhood wage gap may be caused by inadequate family 
employment policies in the presence of improved gender equity 
policies.9 If this were the case, then the passage of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 199310 should improve mothers’ labor 
force standing, with consequent improvement in the motherhood 
wage gap. 
Despite the proliferation of research and publications in recent 
years on the topic of the FMLA, little has been published to date 
presenting a broad overview of the economic impact of mandated 
family leave, particularly regarding its distributional effects for 
women and their children. We focus this Article on the implications 
of family leave policy for wage gaps by motherhood status, as well as 
 5. HOFFMAN & AVERETT, supra note 2, ch. 7, at 7 and ch. 8, at 18–19. 
 6. Id. ch. 8, at 4.  
 7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES § 13, at 395 
(1995), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/1/gen/95statab/labor.pdf.  
 8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES § 12, at 373 
tbl.570 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/labor.pdf. 
 9. Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for Women with Children, 
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (1998). 
 10. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2655 (2000)). 
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on the policy’s distributional effects. We begin by briefly describing 
the progress (and lack of progress) experienced by women in the 
workforce in the past half-century and discussing the factors thought 
to be important in these various outcomes. We then present the 
underlying economic theory of employer mandates, culminating with 
a discussion of the potential labor force impacts of mandated 
employer leave. Next, we use data from the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth11 to estimate the impact of state leave 
policies on employment and wage outcomes for women, both 
mothers and non-mothers, thereby producing estimates of such leave 
policies on the family earnings gap. Finally, we discuss distributional 
implications of the current FMLA policy and suggest policy 
revisions. 
I. WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE IN THE PAST HALF-CENTURY  
Much lies hidden beneath the aggregate labor force participation 
trends presented previously. Clearly, all women—particularly 
mothers—are significantly more likely to engage in paid work than 
they were fifty years ago. This section of the manuscript addresses 
the ways in which employed women are becoming more like their 
employed male counterparts, their remaining differences and the 
factors thought to contribute to these continuing gender disparities. 
Looking at the sex composition of occupations, the degree of 
gender-based occupational segregation began to decline in the 1970s, 
with continued improvement to the present.12 Females have gained 
substantial inroads into executive, administrative, and managerial 
occupations. Also, in 2001, over one-half of economists and 29.3% of 
lawyers were women.13 However, much occupational segregation still 
exists. For example, in 2001, 97.8% of pre-kindergarten and 
kindergarten teachers were female, as were 97% of receptionists. 
 11. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL 
SURVEY OF YOUTH, 1979, available at http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 
2004). For further information about the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, see BEREAU 
OF LABOR STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NLSY97 GEOCODE DATA, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsgeo97.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). 
 12. Id. at 18. 
 13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 8, at 381 tbl.588. 
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Additionally, 97.3% of firefighters, 85.9% of police officers, and 
89.6% of engineers were male.14 
Female workers continue to differ from their male counterparts in 
other ways as well. Female workers are considerably more likely to 
work part-time (defined as fewer than thirty-five hours per week) 
than male workers, and female workers experience more intermittent 
work. Women are also somewhat less likely than men to work in jobs 
with flexible schedules (30% of men versus 27.4% of women), 
resulting from males’ higher status on the managerial ladder.15 This 
lack of continuous, full-time employment hinders wage growth, and 
lack of access to a flexible work schedule can put additional pressure 
on the work and family balancing effort. 
The bulk of the improvement in the U.S. gender wage gap 
occurred during 1980s; in fact, the percentage improvement 
experienced during that decade exceeded that of most of other 
countries.16 Surprisingly, the gender wage gap for year-round, full-
time workers is nearly identical across a wide range of education 
levels. Comparing like-educated women and men, the gender wage 
gap is in the narrow range, seventy-two percent to seventy-five 
percent, for all levels of education between less than high school and 
a doctorate degree. Thus, educational attainment does not enable 
women to overcome this wage gap. The gender wage ratio discussed 
above is closer to equity in many developed countries. For example, 
in Sweden in 1993 the ratio of women’s to men’s wages was ninety 
percent, and in Australia in 1989 and Norway in 1994 the ratios were 
eight-eight percent and eighty-seven percent, respectively.17  
Some concerns remain regarding the ability of women to integrate 
themselves fully into the workforce. While the gender wage gap has 
improved, Waldfogel has demonstrated that mothers continue to earn 
less than like non-mothers, with the ratio of mothers’ to non-mothers’ 
earnings in the ninety percent range since 1970.18 Waldfogel 
estimates that over one half of the gender wage gap is due to the 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 377 tbl.579. 
 16. HOFFMAN & AVERETT, supra note 2, at 11 tbl.3. 
 17. Waldfogel, supra note 9, at 140 tbl.1. 
 18. The exact ratios are: 1970: 91.4%; 1980: 87.9%; and 1994: 90.2%. Id. at 144 tbl.4. 
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motherhood wage gap, and she argues that this family wage gap is 
growing over time.19 New estimates of the motherhood wage gap in 
the range of five to ten percent have recently been produced using 
data from the 1990s.20 To what can this motherhood wage gap 
decrease be attributed? In addition to the limited availability of 
family-friendly workplace policies, the motherhood wage gap has 
been attributed to such unobservable factors as on-the-job 
productivity and energy, individual differences based on timing in 
regard to return to work after childbirth, or inflexible work schedules. 
However, recent empirical evidence has found little support for these 
hypotheses.21 Other research has examined the role that fertility 
timing plays in the motherhood wage effect, and has found that 
fertility delay can enhance wages for college-educated mothers but 
cannot mitigate the motherhood wage gap for lesser-educated 
mothers.22 
What factors contribute to this persistent family wage penalty? 
Waldfogel’s research focuses on the impact of childbirth and 
maternity leave.23 Her results suggest that the availability of job-
protected maternity leave can lessen the negative impact of 
mothering on women’s wages.24 In fact, her international 
comparative research suggests that family leave generosity has a 
strong influence on mitigating the motherhood wage penalty.25 
To what extent can potentially positive wage effects of mandated 
maternity leave be expected to “trickle down” to the lowest wage 
earners? Related in part to the motherhood wage penalty is the 
persistence of disproportionately high poverty rates for families with 
 19. Id. at 138–39. 
 20. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Jean Kimmel, The Motherhood Wage Gap for Women 
in the United States: The Importance of College and Fertility Delay 7–11 (W. Mich. U. Dep’t of 
Econ., Working Paper No. 03-07, 2003), available at http://homepages.wmich.edu/~jkimmel/ 
motherhood%20wage%20gap%20for%20women.pdf. 
 21. Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience, 
Heterogeneity, Work Effort and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 273 
(2003); see also Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 
AM. SOC. REV. 204, 204–11 (2001) (explaining the various factors related to the motherhood 
wage penalty). 
 22. Amuedo-Dorantes & Kimmel, supra note 20. 
 23. Waldfogel, supra note 9. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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young children. In 1997, approximately two-thirds of all families 
living in poverty were families with young children.26 The workers in 
these families are disproportionately less likely to be working in 
firms of sufficient size to be covered by the FMLA.27  
Ellwood and Jencks express a related concern.28 They argue that if 
marriage rates among the lesser-educated remain low (or continue to 
fall), then the pressures on single mothers to support families will 
remain a national concern.29 They worry about a rising unequal 
income distribution in the United States, with an increasingly 
marginalized group of “have-nots” suffering from low family 
incomes. These low family incomes are due in part to low earnings 
for the poorly educated and the motherhood wage penalty. If family-
friendly policies, such as family leave, can reduce the family wage 
gap, then perhaps rising inequality can be tempered. 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF MATERNITY LEAVE AND THE FMLA 
The FMLA was passed and signed into law by President Clinton 
in 1993. While other articles in this symposium describe it in detail, 
the Act’s critical components are a mandated leave period of twelve 
weeks and the job-protected nature of this leave.30 Specifically, all 
workers (with the requisite hours and tenure, and employment in 
 26. Gregory Acs et al., On the Bottom Rung: A Profile of Americans in Low-Income 
Working Families, in NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES 2000 1 (Urban Inst., 
Series A, No. A–42, Oct. 1, 2000). 
 27. See Katherine Ross Phillips, Working For All Families? Family Leave Policies in the 
United States, in THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND FAMILY 170 (Jean Kimmel & Emily P. 
Hoffman eds., 2002); see also COMM’N ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS: THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE 3–5, available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/fmla/chapter3.pdf. The 
Commission was established under section 301 of the FMLA, and some of the Commission’s 
stated duties include collecting data to be used to analyze the progress and impact of the FMLA 
for both workers and their employers. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2631–2636 (2000). According to the survey 
report, lower income workers are very unlikely to be working in FMLA-covered firms or 
eligible for leave. COMM’N ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, supra. 
 28. See David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Growing Differences in Family 
Structure: What Do We Know? Where Do We Look for Answers? (Aug. 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with New Inequality Program, supported by the Russell Sage Foundation). 
 29. Id. While the percentage of married women aged twenty-five to sixty-four with a 
college education fell 6.9% between 1970 and 1995, the percentage decline for those with less 
than a high school education fell by 17.5%. HOFFMAN & AVERETT, supra note 2, at 8, tbl.2. 
 30. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614 (2000). 
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firms with fifty or more workers) are entitled to twelve weeks of 
unpaid leave in any calendar period, after which they must be 
permitted to return to the same job position or an alternative position 
of similar responsibility and compensation.31 Access to job-protected 
leave is at least equally important as access to leave because job-
protected leave has significant implications for wage growth. Rather 
than losing the firm-specific human capital accumulated during the 
pre-leave job tenure, job-protected leave enables the employee to 
return to the same job with the same employer, thereby exploiting her 
previous experience.32 The fact that women change employers more 
often than men during their working lives contributes in large part to 
the gender wage gap. Job-protected leave can reduce the frequency of 
job change for female workers. 
Recent evidence shows that more than one-half of FMLA leave-
takers do not take the leave for pregnancy or childbirth-related 
reasons, despite the legislation’s intent to primarily aid women.33 
Though it has broader applicability to all workers, the FMLA is 
perceived as addressing gender inequality in the workforce. The 
wording of the legislation documents this intent.34  
From an economist’s perspective, what are the mechanisms 
through which mandated leave might affect employment and wages? 
Kaufman and Hotchkiss present an economic analysis of mandated 
maternity leave.35 They analyze the problem in the framework of 
hedonic wage theory.36 This theory explains that firms and workers 
are most concerned with the total compensation package and will be 
willing to trade off wages and nonwage benefits to various degrees.37 
However, there are particular problems arising from mandating a 
 31. Id. 
 32. Jacob Alex Klerman & Arleen Leibowitz, Labor Supply Effects of State Maternity 
Leave Legislation, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 65 (Francine D. Blau & 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997). 
 33. COMM’N ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, supra note 27, at 2–6 tbl.2.5, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/asp/fmla/chapter2.pdf. 
 34. 26 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2000) (stating that “[d]ue to the nature of the roles of men and 
women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, 
and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the working 
lives of men”). 
 35. KAUFMAN & HOTCHKISS, supra note 1, at 413–19. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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benefit that might advantage one readily identifiable group of 
workers more than the average worker. For example, discrimination 
laws prevent employers from paying different groups of workers 
different wages merely because one group might utilize a particular 
benefit more than another.38 According to Summers, 
If wages could freely adjust, these differences in expected 
benefit costs would be offset by differences in wages. If such 
differences are precluded, however, there will be efficiency 
consequences as employers seek to hire workers with lower 
benefit costs. It is thus possible that mandated benefit 
programs can work against the interests of those who most 
require the benefit being offered.39 
Summers makes a strong argument for government intervention in 
the market for fringe benefits based on adverse selection 
considerations, arguing:  
If employees have more information about whether they will 
need parental leave or face high medical bills than their 
employers do, then employers that provide these benefits will 
receive disproportionately more applications from employees 
who require benefits and so will lose money. The market thus 
discourages provision of any fringe benefit.40 
Kaufman and Hotchkiss put this in a different light, explaining that if 
left to private forces, while some firms might finance generous leave 
benefits by reducing wages to cover the nonwage benefit costs, these 
firms are at risk of losing their male employees as the men search for 
more desirable wage/fringe packages.41  
A final argument for mandating employer-provided, job-protected 
maternity leave is an externalities argument based on social benefit. 
Improving females’ access to previously male-dominated occupations 
(as job-protected leave can facilitate) could bring a broader 
 38. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. 
REV. 177, 181–82 (1989). 
 39. Id. at 182. 
 40. Id. at 179. 
 41. KAUFMAN & HOTCHKISS, supra note 1, at 418. 
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perspective to both female and male workers, which could improve 
personal and social well-being in ways that are difficult to measure.  
In summary, what does economic theory tell us about the a priori 
expectations concerning the wage and employment effects of the 
FMLA? Regarding wages, economic theory suggests that they could 
go up or down. Compensating wage differentials (from the hedonic 
theory described earlier) implies that workers will “buy” better leave 
benefits via reduced wages. However, wages could also go up as job 
retention contributes to long-term wage growth. Economic theory 
also suggests that, on net, employment could be affected either 
positively or negatively. Summers explains that mandated maternity 
leave could cause unemployment (or gender discrimination) if wages 
are not fully flexible or employers retaliate.42 But, if the job retention 
component of the FMLA43 improves female job retention or 
encourages more women to undertake professional careers, the 
employment effects might be positive.  
Several recent econometric studies attempt to determine the wage 
and employment effects of family medical leave, although the results 
yield no consistent conclusion on these issues. Waldfogel finds that 
the FMLA has had a very small positive effect on employment, 
suggesting that the availability of leave has induced more women to 
enter and remain in the workforce.44 She also finds no impact of the 
FMLA on wages, interpreting this finding as evidence that 
compensating wage differentials negate the positive wage effects of 
job-protected leave. Waldfogel uses self-reported data on access to 
family leave, and finds that the motherhood wage penalty of eight 
percent is nearly counter-balanced by a six percent premium to 
having and using maternity leave.45 Klerman and Leibowitz find no 
impact of family leave on employment,46 and Baum finds no 
statistically significant impact of family leave on employment or 
 42. Summers, supra note 38, at 177. 
 43. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2, 5 (2000)). 
 44. Jane Waldfogel, The Impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281 (1999). 
 45. Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the United States and Britain: 
Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 505 (1998). 
 46. Klerman & Leibowitz, supra note 32. 
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wages.47 Baum argues that the FMLA has no impact on women’s 
employment or wages because many employers had provided leave 
prior to the enactment of the FMLA and because the mandated leave 
is short and unpaid.48 Examining European nations and considering 
leave times consistent with that mandated by the FMLA, Ruhm finds 
a positive effect on women’s employment, but no impact on women’s 
wages.49 So, taken together, it appears that mandated job-protected 
family leave could actually enhance women’s employment and could 
improve wages, although the bulk of the evidence shows little to no 
impact on either labor market outcome. Hopefully, our research 
findings will contribute in a substantive way to resolve the 
disagreement in the existing literature. 
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND DATA DESCRIPTION  
A. Empirical Approach 
We implement a well-known regression-based method to estimate 
the relationship between family leave policies and employment and 
wage outcomes, while incorporating factors to control the role of 
motherhood status on both labor market outcomes. Our empirical 
model is a straightforward implementation of Mincer’s human capital 
model in which wages are expressed as a function of factors known 
to determine wages.50 The full model to be estimated is a two-
 47. Charles L. Baum II, The Effect of State Maternity Leave Legislation and the 1993 
Family and Medical Leave Act on Employment and Wages, 10 LAB. ECON. 573 (2003). 
 48. However, the DOL report explains that many employers had to modify their leave 
policies in response to FMLA. 
 49. Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates: 
Lessons From Europe, Q. J. ECON. 285, 311–15 (1998). 
 50. JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS 1 (1974). We opt not to 
use the approach relied on by some other researchers in this area, see, e.g., Baum, supra note 
47, because our method is more direct and permits the inclusion of more control variables. See 
Waldfogel, supra note 44, at 284. One econometric concern is that states with good family 
leave policies will also tend to be states with higher wages. We address this concern by 
including a measure of the state’s average annual earnings in both equations. A second concern, 
one of selectivity, hypothesizes that more productive female workers are more likely to get jobs 
in firms with generous leave packages, thereby pushing up the coefficient on leave in the wage 
equation. See Rebecca Blank, Commentary on Chapter 4, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN 
THE WORKPLACE, supra note 32, at 127, 127–29. We combat this problem by including firm 
size in our wage equation, which serves as a proxy for good jobs. 
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equation model, with the first equation modeling the woman’s 
discrete decision to participate in paid employment, and the second 
equation modeling the hourly wage earned by those women who 
work. The two-equation model is shown below: 
(1) 
 ( ) isusPiRiFiHCiDsPiRiFiHCiDgisEmployed +++++== ψθµηγ '''',,,,
(2)
 
( ) ijsijsiPisRijJiHCiDsPisRijJiHCiDfijsLogWage ερλϕφδχβ ++++++== ''''',,,,
Where: D  is a vector containing demographic characteristics of 
the women in our sample, such as their age, race, marital status, and 
motherhood;  is a vector of human capital measures, including 
education, tenure, and work experience;
HC
F includes family size, 
household non-labor income, and women’s family background 
characteristics, such as the educational attainment of parents and 
whether they lived at home by age eighteen; refers to job related 
characteristics, such as whether the woman works in a large firm, 
part-time, and her occupation; and 
J
R  is a vector of local and regional 
characteristics, such as whether the woman resides in an urban area, 
local unemployment rates, and average state earnings. The vector 
P includes the policy measures of interest to this study; that is, the 
provision of state-mandated family leave policies in the case of the 
employment equation and information on the woman’s leave 
eligibility in the case of the wage equation. Finally, the sub-indices i, 
j, and s stand for individual, job, and state-level characteristics, 
respectively. A detailed description of our variables appears in Table 
1.  
TABLE 1: 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Variables Description 
Real Hourly Wage Logarithm of real hourly wage in 1984-1986 
dollars 
 
Working Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman works 
Age Age of respondent 
Hispanic Race dummy  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p115 Kimmel book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 15:115 
 
 
Variables Description 
Black Race dummy 
Other Race Race dummy 
Married Marital status dummy 
Mom Dummy equal to 1 if woman is a mother 
Eligible for Leave Dummy variable equal to 1 if state offers leave 
and woman works in a firm affected by the 
state mandate 
 
Family Size Number of household members 
Less than High School Educational attainment dummy 
High School Educational attainment dummy 
Some College Educational attainment dummy 
College Educational attainment dummy 
Tenure Tenure in weeks 
Work Experience Work experience in weeks 
Part-time Job Dummy variable equal to 1 if woman works 
part-time 
 
Large Firm Dummy equal to 1 if worker’s firm employs 
100 or more workers 
 
Professional & Managers Occupation dummy 
Sales Occupation dummy 
Clerical Occupation dummy 
Craftsmen Occupation dummy 
Operatives Occupation dummy 
Laborers Occupation dummy 
Farm Occupation dummy 
Services Occupation dummy 
Family Non-labor 
Income 
Previous Year Family Income–Respondent’s 
Labor Income 
 
Mother’s Highest Grade Mother’s highest grade completed 
Father’s Highest Grade Father’s highest grade completed 
Live with Parents by Age 
18 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent lived with 
parents at age 18 
 
Urban Dummy equal to 1 if respondent lives in an 
urban area 
 
High Unemployment 
Rate 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent lives in an 
area with high unemployment  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/6
p115 Kimmel book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Distributional Implications 127 
 
 
Variables Description 
Average State Earnings  Average state earnings  
State Mandated Leave Dummy equal to 1 if state offers leave 
 
Equation (1) models the likelihood of being employed and is 
estimated as a probit model.51 The results of this model will serve two 
purposes. First, as the state-mandated leave variable will be included 
directly in the probit model, this model will permit estimation of the 
role, if any, played in the availability of state leave on the woman’s 
employment outcome. Second, the probit model is estimated jointly 
with the log wage equation via Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) to eliminate the econometric problems associated with 
estimating the log wage equation only for those with positive wages. 
The predictions from the probit model (equation (1)) will be used to 
construct a sample-selection term (inverse Mill’s ratio or λ) to be 
included in the wage equation (equation (2)).52 
Note that the actual dependent variable in equation (2) is the 
natural logarithm of the real hourly wage. This log wage is used to 
gain consistency with the rest of the literature and to produce 
parameter estimates with more straightforward interpretations. 
Equation (2) expresses the individual’s hourly wage as a function of 
various factors, including demographic, human capital, job related, 
and local and regional characteristics. Of special interest to us is the 
inclusion of a dichotomous variable indicative of whether the woman 
is a mother. This is a key variable in our analysis, since it will 
produce the direct estimate of the motherhood wage gap. 
Additionally, we control for a variety of local and regional 
characteristics affecting individual earnings. In particular, we include 
the state’s average annual earnings as a proxy for the strength of the 
state’s labor market. This variable is critical to purge the effect of 
generous state compensation from that of state family laws on 
 
 51. A probit model is used to transform a discrete 0-1 dependent variable into a 
continuous probability with a normal distribution. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS 812–16 (4th ed. 2000). 
 52. We estimate the MLE version of the Heckit model, which treats the sample selection 
problem like an omitted variable problem. Id. at 911–13. The Heckit approach was first 
developed and presented by James Heckman. See James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as 
a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979). 
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women’s earnings. Finally, equation (2) includes information on 
women’s leave eligibility.53 
In this analysis, we focus on state policies in existence 
immediately prior to the enactment of the FMLA to determine the 
impact, if any, of a somewhat limited availability of leave. We draw 
our state leave data from Baum, who explains that there are twelve 
states that mandated job-protected, employer-provided maternity 
leave prior to the 1993 enactment.54 We construct two leave variables 
from Baum’s data. First, we construct a dummy variable indicative of 
the presence of state-mandated leave, which equals one for residents 
of those states with job-protected mandated family leave. We include 
this variable in the employment probit to estimate the effect that 
living in a state with a mandated family leave policy may have on 
women’s likelihood of being employed. The presence of state-
mandated leave can have a negative effect on female employment if 
wages do not fully adjust in response to the higher quasi-fixed 
employment costs imposed by the state-mandated leave. In those 
instances, the coefficient will be ψ <0. In contrast, the possibility 
exists that the presence of state-mandated leave allows women to 
retain their jobs as they become mothers; hence, results in a higher 
likelihood of being employed or ψ >0.  
Secondly, we construct a variable indicative of the individual 
worker’s leave eligibility, where eligibility is contingent on residing 
in a state with state mandated leave as well as working in a firm with 
a sufficient number of workers to be covered by the leave statute. We 
include this variable in the log wage equation to determine the impact 
of having access to job-protected family leave on wages. As in the 
 
 53. In order to identify the parameters in our two-equation system, we include a series of 
family related variables (F) as well as information on the presence of a state-mandated leave in 
the employment equation. These variables are excluded from the log wage regression, which, in 
turn, contains a vector of job related characteristics (J) as well as information on women’s leave 
eligibility excluded from the employment equation. In this manner, we guarantee the 
identification of the system via variable exclusion rather than through the functional form. 
 54. Charles L. Baum II, The Effects of Maternity Leave Legislation on Mothers’ Labor 
Supply After Childbirth, 69 S. ECON. J. 772, 782 tbl.5 (2003). Note that these data are widely 
available and have been used by other family leave researchers. The twelve states with job-
protected family leave prior to the passage of FMLA are California, Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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case of examining the impact of a state-mandated leave on 
employment, women leave eligibility can have a negative or a 
positive effect on hourly wages. On the one hand, according to the 
compensating wage differentials theory, the possibility exists that 
employers discount women wages to offset the increased 
employment costs resulting from the mandated leave, i.e., ϕ <0. On 
the other hand, women eligible for maternity leave may be able to 
keep their jobs following their pregnancies, accumulating tenure and 
increasing earnings (hence: ϕ >0).  
We analyze the employment and wage effects of pre-FMLA state 
leave policies contemporaneously. Specifically, we use 1992 data to 
look for a relationship between current state laws and labor market 
outcomes. The non-leave group is all individuals residing in states 
without state leave policies.  
B. Data Description 
We use data drawn from the Geo-coded 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79 Geo-coded file).55 This is a 
nationally-representative sample of 12,686 individuals who were 
fourteen to twenty-one years old as of December 31, 1978.56 This 
cohort was initially interviewed annually from 1979 through 1994, 
and starting in 1994, the interviews were conducted biennially.57 We 
use data for the year 1992 (pre-FMLA) and restrict our analysis to 
women for whom we have information on all the variables of interest 
in our analysis. Table 2 and Table 3 provide the means and standard 
deviations for the variables being used in our analysis for all women, 
all working women, as well as for working mothers eligible and 
ineligible for leave.  
As seen in Table 2, the average age of women in our sample is 
thirty-one. There is an over-representation of Hispanic and black 
women in our sample. Hispanic and black women accounted for 
approximately nineteen percent and twenty-six percent of our sample 
 
 55. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., NLSY GEOCODE DATA, supra note 11. Per the Geo-coded 
file contract agreement with the United States Department of Labor, Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes 
handled all National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data analyses and safeguarded all data files. 
 56. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH, supra 
note 11. 
 
 57. Id.  
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of women, respectively. These percentages are slightly lower among 
working women. Sixty percent of women were married in our 
sample. About seventy-three percent of women in our sample were 
mothers; in contrast, the percent of mothers working was sixty-seven 
percent. Approximately one-fifth of women in our sample have a 
college degree, and about one-fourth of working women were 
college-educated. A similar percentage (twenty-six percent) of 
employed women were working part-time. Finally, family non-labor 
income appears higher among all women (including both working 
and non-working) than among working women, signaling the 
importance of family non-labor income in women’s labor supply 
decisions.  
TABLE 2: 
VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Variables All Women Working Women 
 Means S.D. Means S.D. 
Log Real Hourly Wage 1.8033 0.5202 1.8595 0.5086 
Working 0.7049 0.4561 1.0000 0.0000 
Age 31.0323 2.2379 31.0296 2.2440 
Hispanic 0.1891 0.3916 0.1662 0.3723 
Black 0.2582 0.4377 0.2406 0.4275 
Other Race 0.5527 0.4973 0.5933 0.4913 
Married 0.5890 0.4921 0.6024 0.4895 
Mom 0.7269 0.4456 0.6687 0.4708 
Eligible for Leave 0.2001 0.4001 0.2126 0.4093 
Family Size 3.3802 1.5969 3.0291 1.4047 
Less than High School 0.1202 0.3252 0.0653 0.2472 
High School 0.4506 0.4976 0.4293 0.4951 
Some College 0.2363 0.4249 0.2619 0.4398 
College 0.1928 0.3946 0.2435 0.4293 
Tenure 163.1190 190.1408 220.9049 195.1931 
Work Experience 32.9052 37.6975 39.1697 30.8951 
Part-time Job 0.4181 0.4933 0.2550 0.4360 
Large Firm 0.3058 0.4608 0.4125 0.4924 
Professional & Managers 0.3187 0.4661 0.3451 0.4755 
Sales 0.0858 0.2801 0.0805 0.2722 
Clerical 0.2824 0.4502 0.2885 0.4532 
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Variables All Women Working Women 
Craftsmen 0.0307 0.1726 0.0316 0.1750 
Operatives 0.0692 0.2538 0.0657 0.2479 
Laborers 0.0229 0.1498 0.0199 0.1396 
Farm 0.0085 0.0917 0.0056 0.0747 
Services 0.1818 0.3857 0.1631 0.3696 
Family Non-labor Income 15601.06 124753.6 11292.76 128647.9 
Mother’s Highest Grade 10.8202 3.2030 11.1600 2.9757 
Father’s Highest Grade 10.7872 3.9530 11.1784 3.8070 
Live with Parents by Age 
18 0.6563 0.4750 0.6743 0.4688 
Urban 0.8121 0.3907 0.8155 0.3880 
High Unemployment Rate 0.2734 0.4457 0.2431 0.4291 
Average State Earnings  25774.90 3443.68 25630.75 3386.93 
State Mandated Leave 0.2916 0.4546 0.2867 0.4523 
 
It is of special interest to look at some of the divergent 
characteristics of working mothers with and without leave eligibility. 
Table 3 contains some of these characteristics. First, as expected, log 
hourly wages for mothers eligible for leave are higher than those of 
mothers not eligible for leave. Secondly, while the percentage of non-
black and non-Hispanic working mothers with and without leave 
eligibility only differs by a couple of percentage points, those of 
Hispanic and black mothers with and without leave eligibility are 
substantially different. In particular, the percent of Hispanic working 
mothers enjoying 1992 leave eligibility was practically double the 
percent of Hispanic working mothers without a leave (thirty-one 
percent versus fifteen percent, respectively). The opposite appears to 
be the case among black working mothers, who do not benefit as 
extensively from these leaves. This differential in the incidence of 
leaves by race could, in part, be due to combined differences in 
fertility, labor force participation, and types of jobs held by women in 
each of these demographic groups. Additionally, the family size and 
educational attainment of working mothers with and without leave do 
not appear to be substantially different. Nonetheless, working 
mothers without leave display slightly higher job tenure and work 
experience, and show marginally lower part-time employment rates. 
These women are also less likely to occupy professional and 
managerial occupations, and their family non-labor incomes are 
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lower than those of their counterparts with leaves.58 Finally, states 
offering employer-mandated leaves display higher average earnings 
than those without the mandated leaves, reinforcing the importance of 
accounting for the generosity of states’ earnings to assess the true 
impact of the leave on women’s earnings.  
TABLE 3: 
VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Variables Mothers with Leave Mothers without 
Leave 
 Means S.D. Means S.D. 
Logarithm of real Hourly Wage 1.9533 0.5021 1.7349 0.5000 
Working 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Age 31.3965 2.3239 31.2743 2.2378 
Hispanic 0.3103 0.4636 0.1573 0.3643 
Black 0.1293 0.3363 0.3043 0.4604 
Other Race 0.5603 0.4974 0.5383 0.4988 
Married 0.7069 0.4562 0.6625 0.4731 
Mom 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Eligible for Leave 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Family Size 3.6509 1.1598 3.6625 1.1463 
Less than High School 0.1255 0.3321 0.0807 0.2726 
High School 0.4545 0.4990 0.4865 0.5001 
Some College 0.2684 0.4441 0.2660 0.4421 
College 0.1515 0.3593 0.1667 0.3729 
Tenure 216.82 203.37 219.57 196.17 
Work Experience 36.4095 29.0748 39.2547 31.0176 
Part-time Job 0.3276 0.4703 0.2808 0.4496 
Large Firm 0.5259 0.5004 0.4289 0.4952 
Professional & Managers 0.3190 0.4671 0.2930 0.4554 
Sales 0.0216 0.1455 0.0921 0.2894 
Clerical 0.3448 0.4763 0.2723 0.4454 
Craftsmen 0.0216 0.1455 0.0373 0.1895 
Operatives 0.0991 0.2995 0.0870 0.2819 
 
 58. Using the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2000 Employee and Employer Surveys, 
Phillips notes that lack of access to paid leave is a significant problem, as almost three-fourths 
of low-income leave-takers reported taking unpaid leave. Phillips, supra note 27, at 159. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/6
p115 Kimmel book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Distributional Implications 133 
 
 
Variables Mothers with Leave Mothers without 
Leave 
Laborers 0.0302 0.1714 0.0207 0.1425 
Farm 0.0043 0.0657 0.0052 0.0718 
Services 0.1595 0.3669 0.1925 0.3945 
Family Non-labor Income 
19761.43 97884.57 7769.18 
130726.
7 
Mother’s Highest Grade 10.2888 3.4639 10.8499 2.8158 
Father’s Highest Grade 10.4655 3.7829 10.6398 3.7853 
Live with Parents by Age 18 0.6336 0.4829 0.6325 0.4824 
Urban 0.8836 0.3214 0.7712 0.4203 
High Unemployment Rate 0.3707 0.4840 0.2133 0.4098 
Average State Earnings  
28021.13 2915.63 
24602.6
4 2882.21 
State Mandated Leave 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Results from the employment probit and the wage regressions are 
presented in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.59 First, we run a 
baseline model (model (1)) that includes all the model variables with 
the exception of family leave variables. In this manner, we are able to 
obtain an estimate of the motherhood wage gap for our sample. 
Subsequently, in model (2), we add the family leave variables—a 
dummy for the passage of a state-mandated leave in the employment 
probit and a dummy for the woman’s leave eligibility in the log wage 
regression. Finally, in model (3), we re-estimate our two-equation 
system, this time adding an interaction term of the motherhood 
dummy and the woman’s eligibility for leave in the log wage 
regression. This interaction term provides an estimate of the effect 
that eligibility for a medical and family leave might have on the 
motherhood wage gap. Given the purpose of the study, we will focus 
our discussion on the coefficients of the motherhood and family leave 
variables in both the employment and wage regressions.  
 
 59. Regression results were calculated using the statistical software, STATA, procedure 
called “Heckman.” See STATA PRESS, REFERENCE MANUAL EXTRACT RELEASE 6.0 157–68 
(1999). 
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Table 4 displays the results from the employment probits for each 
of the aforementioned specifications. Of special interest to us are the 
coefficients for the state mandated leave in models (2) and (3).60 It is 
interesting to note that the enactment of a family and medical leave 
law in the state appears to have a negative impact on female 
employment. This result confirms the hypothesis that an increase in 
quasi-fixed employment costs, such as is the case with a family and 
medical leave, can result in a destruction of female employment on 
the part of employers if wages are not fully flexible.  
TABLE 4: 
COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF PROBIT MODEL FOR 
BEING AT WORK 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Variables 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
-0.8064** -0.8766** -0.8768** Age 
 
(0.3651) (0.3708) (0.3708) 
0.0133** 0.0143** 0.0143** Age Squared 
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) 
-0.0077 0.0332 0.0332 Hispanic 
 
(0.0881) (0.0889) (0.0891) 
-0.0841 -0.0685 -0.0680 Black 
(0.0760) (0.0768) (0.0769) 
0.1883*** 0.1795*** 0.1798*** Married 
 
(0.0686 (0.6917) (0.0693) 
-0.5799*** -0.5861*** -0.5846*** Mom 
(0.0881) (0.0894) (0.0894) 
-0.1133*** -0.1142*** -0.1145*** Family Size 
(0.0276) (0.0271 (0.0273) 
0.5735*** 0.5503*** 0.5506*** High School 
(0.0896) (0.0909) (0.0909) 
Some College 0.8508*** 0.8371*** 0.8372*** 
 
 60. Note that, while the same regressors are included in models (2) and (3), their 
coefficients differ slightly because each probit model is estimated simultaneously with its 
corresponding log wage equation. This simultaneity produces slightly different probit 
coefficients despite having the same set of regressors. 
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Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 (0.1035) (0.1047) (0.1047) 
1.0207*** 0.9906*** 0.9903*** College 
(0.1221) (0.1236) (0.1238) 
-1.62e-06*** -0.16e-06*** -1.56e-06*** Family Non-labor Income 
 
3.16e-07 3.16e-07 3.17e-07 
-0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0026 Mother’s Highest Grade 
0.01215 (0.0123) (0.0123) 
0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 Father’s Highest Grade 
 
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
-0.0174 -0.0363 -0.0364 
Live with Parents by Age 18 
(0.0589) (0.0594) (0.0594) 
0.0067 0.0425 0.0424 Urban 
 
(0.0732) (0.0753) (0.0753) 
-0.2137*** -0.1787*** -0.1788*** High Unemployment Rate 
(0.0653) (0.0670) (0.0670) 
-0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 Average State Earnings 
(8.77e-06) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
- -0.2036*** -0.2008*** State Mandated Leave 
 
- (0.0730) (0.0731) 
Observations 2587 2438 2438 
Log Likelihood -2216.214 -2079.866 -2079.556 
Note: *** Indicates significance at the one percent level; ** Indicates significance at 
the five percent level; and * Indicates significance at the ten percent level. All 
regressions include a constant term and occupation dummies.  
What is the effect of family and medical leave eligibility on 
women’s wages? Does it have a differential impact on mothers versus 
non-mothers? In order to answer these questions, we turn to the 
results displayed in Tables 5 and 6. Looking at the coefficient for the 
motherhood dummy variable in model (1) in Table 5, we can see that, 
on average, mothers in our sample experienced a motherhood wage 
gap of approximately eleven percent.  
The coefficient on women’s eligibility for a family or medical 
leave in model (2) in Table 5 provides further information on the 
overall effect of eligibility on their earnings. On average, current 
leave eligibility raises women’s earnings by approximately seven 
percent. The positive effect of family and medical leave eligibility on 
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wages hints at the importance of leave benefits in promoting job 
retention that contributes to long-term wage growth.  
TABLE 5: 
COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS OF  
REAL HOURLY WAGE REGRESSIONS 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Age 0.0504 0.0767 0.0772 
 (0.1209) (0.1243) (0.1244) 
Age Squared -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Hispanic -0.0200 -0.0267 -0.0269 
 (0.0269) (0.0275) (0.0275) 
Black -0.1057*** -0.0966*** -0.0961*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0245) (0.0245) 
Married 0.0103 0.0089 0.0089 
 (0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0208) 
Mom -0.1084*** -0.1077*** -0.1154*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0294) (0.0315) 
Eligible for Leave - 0.0714*** 0.0482 
 - (0.0267) (0.0397) 
Mom*Eligible for 
Leave 
- - 0.0371 
 - - (0.0471) 
High School 0.2269*** 0.2392*** 0.2399*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0454) (0.0458) 
Some College 0.3591*** 0.3778*** 0.3776*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0513) (0.0519) 
College 0.5949*** 0.6222*** 0.6223*** 
 (0.0577) (0.0553) (0.0560) 
Tenure 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Tenure Squared -1.01e-06*** -9.77e-07*** -9.79e-07*** 
 (2.17e-07) (2.23e-07) (2.23e-07) 
Work Experience 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Work Experience 
Squared 
-6.78e-06* -6.01e-06 -6.05e-06 
 (4.07e-06) (4.08e-06) (4.07e-06) 
Large firm 0.1623*** 0.1595*** 0.1594*** 
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Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 (0.0193) (0.0198) (0.0198) 
Part-time Job -0.0463** -0.0590** -0.0592** 
 (0.0225) (0.0233) (0.0233) 
Urban 0.1353*** 0.1357*** 0.1355*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0264) (0.0263) 
High 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.0861*** -0.0808*** -0.0814*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Average State 
Earnings  
0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 
 (2.98e-06) (3.52e-06) (3.52e-06) 
Lambda 0.1444** 0.1563*** 0.1535** 
 (0.0718) (0.0615) (0.0643) 
Uncensored 
Observations 
 
1833 1684 1684 
Wald Chi-squared  1006.76 1042.51 1036.37 
Prob > Chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *** Indicates significance at the one percent level; ** Indicates significance 
at the five percent level; and * Indicates significance at the ten percent level. All 
regressions include a constant term and occupation dummies. 
To assess further whether the leave has a differential effect on the 
earnings of mothers and non-mothers, we interact the motherhood 
and the leave eligibility dummies in model (3). The coefficient on 
this interaction term is positive, but not statistically different from 
zero. However, to conclude that leave eligibility does not help reduce 
the motherhood wage gap would be incorrect. In order to assess 
whether this is the case, we need to look at the joint significance of 
motherhood, women’s eligibility for leave, and the interaction term 
involving both variables. Table 6 displays the results from this 
exercise. Eligibility for family and medical leave among mothers 
effectively reduces the motherhood wage gap (which goes from a 
twelve percent gap to approximately a three percent gap).  
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TABLE 6: 
COMPARISON OF LEAVE WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS 
Category Computation Model (2) Model (3) 
  Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E. or Chi2 test 
of Joint 
Significance) 
Wage Effect of Leave on 
All Women 
 
Eligible for Leave 0.0714*** 0.0482 
  (0.0267) (0.0397) 
Wages Earned by 
Mothers Without Leave 
 
Mom -0.1077*** -0.1154*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0315) 
Wage Effect of Leave on 
All Mothers 
(Mom+Eligible for 
Leave +Mom*Eligible 
for Leave) 
-  
-0.0301*** 
(60.53) 
Effect of Leave on 
Female Employment 
 
State Mandated Leave -0.2036*** -0.2008*** 
  (0.0730) (0.0731) 
Note: *** Indicates significance at the one percent level; ** Indicates significance at 
the five percent level; and * Indicates significance at the ten percent level. 
In addition to the motherhood and leave effects shown in Tables 5 
and 6, results for other standard wage equation controls are given. A 
standard finding in the economics literature is the lower earnings of 
black women even after relevant productivity factors are controlled. 
In our baseline regression (model (1)), the coefficient implies that 
black female workers earn, on average, eleven percent less than their 
non-black and non-Hispanic counterparts. Secondly, the regression 
analysis confirms the positive relationship between human capital—
in the form of higher educational attainment and tenure—and wages 
predicted by the human capital theory. Similarly, employees of large 
firms have enjoyed a significant wage premium of sixteen percent. 
On average, part-time workers also experience a wage gap, as 
those workers earned five to six percent less than their full-time 
counterparts. Finally, we include a series of location and regional 
controls in our wage regression analysis to account for differences in 
pay in rural versus urban areas, as well as in areas with a booming 
economy or more generous state compensation versus areas with a 
lagging economy or less generous state compensation systems. All of 
these spatial characteristics seem to significantly affect earnings to 
some extent. Finally, it is worth noting the statistically significantly 
different from zero inverse Mill’s ratio (Lambda), which confirms the 
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importance of accounting for the sample selection into working when 
examining earnings. In addition, the lambda coefficients reveal the 
existence of a positive selection into working.  
V. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our results suggest a strong negative effect of mandated family 
leave on employment, implying that gender discrimination has 
resulted from a federally mandated benefit that employers fear will 
increase costs. Second, our results show that availability and 
eligibility for leave have a strong positive effect on wages, nearly 
overcoming the negative wage impact of motherhood. This 
encouraging finding suggests that the job-protection nature of the 
FMLA61 overcomes the potentially wage-depressing effects implied 
by compensating wage differentials. 
Survey data from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) inform 
this discussion on several fronts.62 First, despite the employment-
depressing effects of state mandated leave (at least in the short-term), 
most employers responding to the DOL survey report no significant 
increases in business costs resulting from the FMLA, suggesting that 
the negative employment effect we find is a result of fear of the 
unknown rather than actual costs.63 Also, while FMLA leaves are 
more likely to be maternity-related in 2000 than in 1995, over one-
half of leaves are not taken for maternity-related problems. This 
suggests that the lack of employer-provided paid sick and personal 
time is a significant burden on families, particularly given that 
FMLA-mandated leave is unpaid. 
Our results provide strong evidence for Waldfogel’s suggestion 
that family leave might serve to ameliorate the negative wage effects 
of having children.64 We find that leave eligibility reduces this gap by 
two-thirds in the short-term. It appears that leave eligibility can be 
effective in the fight against gender workplace inequity. 
 61. See supra note 43. 
 62. COMM’N ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, supra note 27. 
 63. Id. at 3–5 tbl.A2. Also discussed in this report is employee retention. Once granted 
FMLA leaves, approximately ninety-eight percent of workers return to leave-granting 
employers. 
 64. Waldfogel, supra note 45. 
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However, there seems to be a clear consensus that much remains 
undone in the battle against gender workplace disparities. In fact, in 
its 2003 decision upholding the applicability of the FMLA for state 
employees, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled continuing workplace 
gender equity concerns.65 When Congress enacted the FMLA, it had 
significant evidence of a “long and extensive history of sex 
discrimination” with respect to the administration of leave benefits by 
the states, which is weighty enough to justify the enactment of 
“prophylactic legislation.”66 In addition, “by creating an across-the-
board, routine employment benefit for all eligible employees, 
Congress sought to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be 
stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female 
employees, and that employers could not evade leave obligations 
simply by hiring men.”67 Despite the fact that the Court’s ruling was 
decided by a five to four vote, the strong language is an encouraging 
sign of the acceptance of workplace gender disparities as a real 
phenomenon warranting concern at the national level. 
What might be done to further the progress of women in the 
workplace? We feel that policy should be considered on three fronts: 
(1) providing for wage replacement for some fraction of the worker’s 
wages; (2) expanding FMLA coverage to smaller firms; and (3) 
attempting to develop a policy targeted at fathers to encourage their 
participation in child-related FMLA leaves. Clearly, the greatest 
inadequacy with the FMLA is that the mandated leave is unpaid. 
President Clinton’s “Baby UI”68 rule permitted states to use funds 
from their unemployment trust funds to finance paid family leaves.69 
However, in a major setback for proponents of paid leave, President 
Bush repealed this rule in October 2003.70 According to Judith L. 
 65. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 723 n.1 (2003). Note that the 
Court ruling repeats this policy emphasis, despite the fact that the case under consideration 
regarded a male worker needing leave to care for an ill wife. Id. Thus, this case did not involve 
a female’s maternity leave and was not related to children at all. 
 66. Id. at 724.  
 67. Id. at 726. 
 68. See Regulations for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 20 C.F.R. 
§ 604 (2003).  
 69. In 2002, then-California Governor Gray Davis, signed legislation permitting the use of 
UI (“unemployment insurance”) funds as partial wage replacement for family leave. 
 70. 68 Fed. Reg. 58,540, 58,549 (Oct. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 604). 
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Lichtman, President of the National Partnership for Women & 
Families, “President Bush has turned his back on working women, 
men and their families who are struggling to be responsible 
employees and responsible parents. In doing so, he makes a mockery 
of his claim to care about our nation’s working families.”71 
An additional reason to focus on paid leave is the large number of 
children growing up in single-parent households. While this situation 
has improved in recent years (due in large part to the strong economy 
and welfare reform), still nearly one-in-five young children live in 
single-mother families and about five percent live in father-only 
families.72 The need for caregiver assistance is most acute in single-
parent families, and these numbers remain strong and are likely to 
grow as the growth bubble of the 1990s fades from view. 
A second avenue of policy improvement is to extend the coverage 
of the FMLA to smaller firms. Approximately forty percent of 
workers do not work for firms of sufficient size to be covered by the 
FMLA, and these forty percent are disproportionately young, female, 
and low income.73 According to Phillips, there is an inequitable 
access to employer-provided family leave; in particular, access is 
disparate across income and occupations.74  
Additionally, our own analyses of the DOL data reveal strong 
disparities in access to coverage by sex. Male workers without 
FMLA eligibility tend to be visibly disadvantaged on the standard 
measures (education, for example), while the unaffordability of leave 
 71. Press Release, Judith L. Lichtman, Repeal of “Baby UI” Rule Makes Mockery of 
President Bush’s Claim to Support Working Families, (Oct. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/INCLCnews.cfm?NewsItemID=556&zoom=true. Lichtman 
is the President of the National Partnership for Women & Families. 
 72. Gregory Acs & Sandi Nelson, The More Things Change? Children’s Living 
Arrangements Since Welfare Reform, in SNAPSHOTS OF AMERICA’S FAMILIES III No. 10, at 1 
(Urban Inst. 2003). 
 73. Phillips, supra note 27. 
 74. Id. Phillips adds:  
Coverage limits, eligibility criteria, and benefit levels combine to limit access to 
family leave for low-income workers and workers in blue-collar and service 
occupations. As welfare reform continues to influence the labor market behavior of 
low-income caregivers, the need for family leave among the population of low-income 
workers will grow. 
Id. at 177. 
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(or non-leave-taking for other reasons) extends farther into the 
middle rung for female workers. As women are considerably more 
likely to provide care for young children and older relatives, seeing 
that leave-needing applies to a seemingly “fortunate” class of female 
workers is cause for concern. A final factor suggesting extended 
coverage of FMLA is warranted by the fact that recent job growth has 
been experienced disproportionately in smaller firms. So, without any 
extension of coverage, the ranks of those covered under the current 
rules will decline. 
The final concern, one of male leave-taking and, indeed, male 
responsibility for household tasks, is a more difficult nut to crack. 
Evidence from Europe suggests that even direct policy incentives to 
encourage fathers to take more paternal leave has experienced only 
limited success.75 As Selmi notes, as a society we cannot approach 
gender equity in the workforce until (among other improvements) 
men begin taking on more of the traditionally female caretaker 
roles.76 In fact, as argued by Bergmann, the current status and 
utilization of family leave policies in this country tends to lead to 
increased workplace gender inequities, rather than improving such 
disparities.77 She concludes that the critical factor has been the lack 
of males’ movement towards acceptance of greater responsibility in 
household activities.78 
It is not evident how policy-makers could go about changing both 
males’ and females’ attitudes regarding gender roles in the 
household, or whether policy-makers will ever undertake this issue. 
Nonetheless, there are positive signs. First, our evidence that the 
motherhood wage gap can be reduced via leave eligibility is 
encouraging. Second, other workplace policies (such as flexible-
benefit plans or on-site childcare) can make female workers’ 
household responsibilities less burdensome. Finally, how the 
employment and wage effects of leave-eligibility will play out over 
the longer term remains to be seen. 
 75. Barbara R. Bergmann, Work-Family Policies and Equality Between Women and Men, 
in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 32, at 278–79.  
 76. Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 709 
(2000). 
 77. Bergmann, supra note 75, at 277. 
 78. Id. at 277–78. 
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